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The financial crisis has re-ignited the fierce debate about the merits of financial globalization and its
implications for growth, especially for developing countries. The empirical literature has not been
able to conclusively establish the presumed growth benefits of financial integration. Indeed, a new
literature proposes that the indirect benefits of financial integration may be more important than the
traditional financing channel emphasized in previous analyses. A major complication, however, is
that there seem to be certain “threshold” levels of financial and institutional development that an economy
needs to attain before it can derive the indirect benefits and reduce the risks of financial openness.
In this paper, we develop a unified empirical framework for characterizing such threshold conditions.
We find that there are clearly identifiable thresholds in variables such as financial depth and institutional
quality—the cost-benefit trade-off from financial openness improves significantly once these threshold
conditions are satisfied. We also find that the thresholds are lower for foreign direct investment and
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I. Introduction 
 
The worldwide financial crisis has dramatically driven home the downside of financial 
globalization. Many emerging market and developing economies had to grapple with surges 
of capital inflows earlier in this decade and are now experiencing a sharp reversal of those 
inflows. Financial linkages have served as a channel for the global financial turmoil to reach 
their shores. This will no doubt re-ignite the fierce debate about the merits of financial 
globalization and its implications for growth and volatility, especially for developing 
countries.  
 
In theory, financial globalization should facilitate efficient international allocation of capital 
and promote international risk sharing. These benefits should be much greater for 
developing countries. These countries are relatively capital scarce and labor rich, so access 
to foreign capital should help them increase investment and grow faster. Developing 
countries also have more volatile output growth than advanced industrial economies, which 
makes their potential welfare gains from international risk sharing much greater.  
 
However, the empirical literature has not been able to conclusively establish the growth and 
stability benefits of financial integration. In particular, cross-country studies have not 
yielded robust evidence that financial openness has a positive effect on growth. Studies 
using microeconomic (firm- or industry-level) data or those that look at specific events such 
as equity market liberalizations do detect significant growth effects, but it remains an open 
question whether these effects scale up when one considers the more general concept of 
financial openness and its effects on growth. Moreover, for developing countries with low 
to intermediate levels of financial openness, there is equally sparse evidence that financial 
integration has delivered its other presumed benefit--improved risk sharing and better 
consumption smoothing.  
 
Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei (2009) survey this extensive literature and propose an 
alternative framework for analyzing the macroeconomic implications of financial 
globalization in order to pull together the different strands of evidence. These authors point 
out that in theory financial globalization should catalyze domestic financial market 
development, improve corporate and public governance, and provide incentives for greater 
macroeconomic policy discipline. Such indirect benefits may be more important than the   2 
traditional financing channel emphasized in previous analyses. Indeed, recent work 
stimulated by the phenomenon of global current account imbalances suggests that 
developing countries that are more open to certain types of financial flows but overall are 
less reliant on foreign capital and finance more of their investment through domestic 
savings have on average experienced better growth performance.
2 
 
A major complication, however, is that there seem to be certain “threshold” levels of 
financial and institutional development that an economy needs to attain before it can get the 
full indirect benefits and reduce the risks of capital account liberalization. It has generally 
been the case that industrial countries—which typically have better institutions, more stable 
macro policies, and deeper financial markets than developing countries—have been the 
main beneficiaries of financial globalization. This has led many authors to argue that 
developing countries should focus on building up their institutional capacity and 
strengthening their financial markets before opening up their capital accounts (e.g., Rodrik 
and Subramanian, 2009). How to balance these considerations against the potential benefits 
to be gained from financial integration is a pressing policy question, now that developing 
countries again face difficult choices about whether and how to liberalize capital account 
transactions further.  
 
Framing the issue this way generates a set of pointed questions that are relevant for 
translating academic analysis of financial globalization into implications for policies toward 
capital account liberalization. How can countries improve the benefit-risk trade-off 
associated with integration into international capital markets? Is there a well-defined 
threshold level of economic characteristics beyond which the trade-off improves and makes 
opening of the capital account beneficial and less risky for a developing country? 
 
There is a substantial theoretical and empirical literature, mostly of recent vintage, 
suggesting that financial sector development, institutional quality, trade openness, and the 
stability of macroeconomic policies all play important roles in realizing the benefits of 
financial openness. For instance, a deep and well-supervised financial sector is essential for 
efficiently intermediating foreign finance into productive investments. It can also be helpful 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
2 See Aizenman, Pinto and Radziwill (2007), Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) and Prasad, Rajan, and 
Subramanian (2007).    3 
in reducing the adverse effects of capital flow volatility. Similarly, countries with better 
institutions (less corruption and red tape, better corporate and public governance) attract 
relatively more FDI and portfolio equity flows, which are more stable than debt flows and 
are also more likely to promote indirect benefits. The existing literature points to the 
existence of such threshold effects but lacks a unifying framework that can be used to 
interpret the results and derive policy implications.   
 
Our main contribution is to provide a unified empirical framework for studying the concept 
of thresholds in the process of financial integration and for analyzing the policy 
implications of this framework for the process of capital account liberalization. We then 
provide a new set of results on thresholds in different dimensions using a common empirical 
approach. In the process, we tackle a number of complex measurement issues that need to 
be dealt with in order to provide more coherence to the existing literature. We also make a 
modest methodological contribution by showing how to adapt semiparametric estimation 
techniques to estimate key interaction relationships in growth regressions in a flexible 
manner.  
 
We report some initial progress on framing and addressing a more difficult set of practical 
questions directly related to various policy choices. For instance, what are the confidence 
intervals around different threshold conditions? This is important for determining the policy 
relevance of the estimated thresholds and for identifying zones that are clearly hazardous or 
clearly safe for undertaking financial opening. We take an agnostic approach towards 
various measurement issues on which there is no consensus in the literature, including how 
best to measure financial development and financial openness. We also try to account for 
possible differences in threshold conditions across different types of cross-border flows. 
 
Based on an analysis of data over a period of three decades prior to the recent financial 
crisis, we find that there are indeed clearly identifiable thresholds in variables such as 
financial depth and institutional quality. Although there are differences in the results we 
obtain from various methodologies and the confidence intervals tend to be large, some of 
the key thresholds are fairly precisely estimated and have practical empirical content. We 
also find that the thresholds are lower for foreign direct investment and portfolio equity 
liabilities compared to those for debt liabilities. 
   4 
We begin, in Section II, by reviewing some of the existing literature and providing a 
synthesis that enables us to map out some of the key issues that need to be addressed in 
analyzing threshold effects. In Section III, we tackle a number of measurement issues, 
including how to measure financial openness and the different threshold variables. In 
Section IV, we discuss the empirical strategy to get at the issue of thresholds. Our basic 
results, including some stylized facts to motivate the more detailed analysis, are in Section 
V. In Section VI, we conduct a variety of sensitivity tests on our baseline results. We then 
present a number of extensions in Section VII. We conclude, in Section VIII, by 
highlighting the main findings and discussing their policy implications. 
 
II. Synthesis of Theory and Evidence 
In prior research, a number of avenues have been explored to reconcile the strong 
theoretical prediction that financial integration should boost long-run growth in developing 
economies with the weak empirical evidence. Some authors have argued that countries that 
do not have the right initial conditions can experience growth surges due to financial 
integration but they inevitably experience crises, which pulls down their long-run growth. 
Others have argued that countries that lack certain structural features are not able to derive 
the full benefits of financial integration even if they can escape crises.
3  
 
Kose et al. (2009) synthesize these two lines of argument into a framework that 
characterizes variables that influence the relationship between financial integration and 
growth as a set of “threshold conditions.” Figure 1 schematically depicts this framework 
and lists the main threshold conditions. These include an economy’s structural features--the 
extent of financial sector development, institutional quality, and trade integration--and also 
the macroeconomic policy framework.  
 
In theory, financial development enhances the growth benefits of financial globalization and 
reduces vulnerability to crises. Domestic and international collateral constraints play a 
particularly important role in financially underdeveloped low-income economies where 
access to arm’s length financing is limited. A number of recent studies show how, in 
different theoretical settings, the interaction of these constraints can lead to unpredictable 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
3 For a comprehensive review of the related literature see Literature Appendix Tables 1-4 in the web 
link to the working paper version of this paper.   5 
and possibly adverse effects of capital account liberalization.
4 Shifts in the direction of 
capital flows can induce or exacerbate boom-bust cycles in developing countries that lack 
deep financial sectors (Aghion and Banerjee, 2005). Moreover, mismanaged domestic 
financial sector liberalizations have been a major contributor to crises associated with 
financial integration (Mishkin, 2006). 
 
Cross-sectional studies generally find significant positive interaction effects between 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and financial depth (ratio of private credit to GDP) on 
growth. However, the implied financial depth thresholds for obtaining a positive coefficient 
on financial openness vary substantially within and across studies. For example, across 
Hermes and Lensink (2003), Alfaro et al. (2004), and Carkovic and Levine (2005) the 
estimated credit to GDP thresholds vary from 13 percent to 48 percent. There are mixed 
results from studies where financial depth is interacted with other financial openness 
measures. Bekaert et al. (2005) and Hammel (2006) find higher growth following equity 
market liberalizations in countries with higher private credit/stock market turnover and 
stock market capitalization, respectively (also see Bekaert et al., 2009; Mukerji, 2009). 
Using broader measures of financial openness, Prasad et al. (2007) find evidence of 
high/low interaction effects among non-industrial countries (also see Klein and Olivei, 
2001; Chinn and Ito, 2006; Coricelli et al., 2008) but Kraay (1998) and Arteta et al. (2003) 
do not. 
 
The quality of corporate and public governance, the legal framework, the level of 
corruption, and the degree of government transparency can affect the allocation of resources 
in an economy. Some authors argue that precursors of crises such as flawed macroeconomic 
and structural policies can also be traced back to weak institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2003). 
Since capital inflows make more resources available, the quality of institutions matters 
more for financially open economies. Post-mortems of the Asian financial crisis have 
pinned a large portion of the blame on crony capitalism that reflected corruption and weak 
public governance (Haber, 2002; Krueger, 2002). Indeed, an intermediate degree of 
financial openness with selective capital controls may be most conducive to crony 
capitalism, as it gives politically well-connected firms preferential access to foreign capital 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
4  See  Caballero  and  Krishnamurthy  (2001),  Aghion,  Bacchetta,  and  Banerjee  (2004),  Mendoza, 
Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2007) and Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2006)   6 
(Johnson and Mitton, 2003). Weak protection of property rights in poor countries means 
that foreign financing may not be directed to long-gestation, investment-intensive, and low-
initial profitability projects (including infrastructure) where such financing could be 
particularly useful given domestic financing constraints (Rajan and Zingales, 1998).  
 
Bekaert et al. (2005) and Chanda (2005) find interaction effects between institutional 
quality and financial openness in promoting growth but Kraay (1998) and Quinn and 
Toyoda (2008) do not. Klein (2005) finds that only intermediate levels of institutional 
quality are associated with a positive correlation between growth and capital account 
liberalization, hinting at the possibility of nonlinear threshold effects. Countries with better 
corporate and public governance receive more of their inflows in the form of FDI and 
portfolio equity; these are more stable than debt flows and also confer more of the indirect 
benefits of financial integration (Wei, 2001). Some authors have used a country’s level of 
income as a proxy for overall institutional development and interacted that with financial 
openness. Edwards (2001) and Edison et al. (2004) find evidence of a positive linear 
interaction and an inverted U-shaped relationship, respectively. However, Arteta et al. 
(2003), Carkovic and Levine (2005) and Quinn and Toyoda (2008) do not find robust 
evidence of such relationships. 
 
Trade openness reduces the probability of crises associated with financial openness and 
mitigates the costs of crises if they do occur. Economies that are more open to trade have to 
undergo smaller real exchange rate depreciations for a given current account adjustment, 
face less severe balance sheet effects from depreciations and, as a result, are less likely to 
default on their debt. This makes them less vulnerable to sudden stops and financial crises 
(Calvo et al., 2004; Frankel and Cavallo, 2004). Trade integration puts an economy in a 
better position to continue servicing its debt and export its way out of a recession (Edwards, 
2004). Eichengreen (2001) notes that financial integration without trade integration could 
lead to a misallocation of resources as capital inflows may go to sectors in which a country 
doesn’t have a comparative advantage (also see Aizenman and Noy, 2008).  
 
Capital account liberalization is more likely to be successful if it is supported by good 
fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies. Weak or incompatible policies can increase the 
risk of crises from an open capital account. For instance, the combination of a fixed 
exchange rate and an open capital account has been implicated in a number of currency   7 
crises (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995; Wyplosz, 2004). Similarly, managing capital inflows can 
be especially complicated in developing economies with large fiscal deficits and procyclical 
fiscal policy (Ishii et al., 2002; Calvo, Reinhart, and Vegh, 2004; IMF, 2007). These 
findings have been used to argue that capital account liberalization can serve as a 
commitment device for sound macroeconomic policies (Bartolini and Drazen, 1997; 
Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2006). Arteta et al. (2003) report evidence of threshold effects 
related to macro policies in generating positive growth effects of financial openness. Mody 
and Murshid (2005) find that better macro policies enhance the impact of financial openness 
on investment growth.  
 
In summary, there is a substantial theoretical and empirical literature that serves as a basis 
for positing the existence of threshold conditions. However, this literature is disparate and 
does not provide clear guidance about the precise nature of the threshold relationship or 
how one would translate the theory into a reduced-form empirical framework. Some models 
suggest the existence of nonlinear threshold effects but the form of nonlinearity is not clear.  
 
The empirical literature has reported many interesting results but the robustness of these 
results and the estimated thresholds vary widely. Moreover, each of these studies typically 
focuses on one conditioning variable and one indicator of financial openness, and most of 
them use a simple linear interaction specification. The extent to which countries satisfy 
different potential thresholds or the trade-offs between different threshold variables has not 
been examined, nor has the economic significance of the threshold levels. Finally, the 
potentially wide confidence intervals around the thresholds have not been emphasized. 
Thus, while there is a great deal of evidence that threshold conditions matter, the existing 
literature is not organized around a consistent framework, making it difficult to draw policy 
conclusions about capital account liberalization.  
 
III. Measurement and Data 
In this section, we discuss our approach to several key measurement issues and present our 
dataset. We take an agnostic approach to some of the complex measurement issues. Our 
approach will be to pick baseline measures of certain variables and then conduct extensive 
robustness tests of those baseline results using alternative measures. A detailed description 
of the variables in our dataset, as well as their sources, are presented in the Data Appendix.  
   8 
There is an important distinction between traditional de jure measures of openness, i.e., 
restrictions on capital account transactions, and de facto openness. Capital controls are the 
relevant policy tool, but there can be differences in their degree of enforcement over time. 
Besides, when analyzing how financial openness influences growth, what matters is how 
much an economy is actually integrated into international capital markets. 
 
We use as our baseline measure of financial openness the sum of a country’s total stocks of 
external assets and liabilities, expressed as a ratio to nominal GDP. This is a summary 
measure of a country’s total exposure to international financial markets. We also look at 
stocks of liabilities—cumulated measures of inflows into a country—that may be most 
relevant for developing economies as well as various measures of gross and net flows. In 
some of our analysis, we also look at de jure capital account openness based on an indicator 
of the proportion of years in which the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions indicates the absence of capital account restrictions.  
 
For each of the threshold categories, we have to choose an appropriate measure that is 
conceptually sound and for which data are available for our broad sample of countries.  
 
a. Financial depth: We use the ratio of private credit to GDP as a proxy for financial depth, 
recognizing that this is a narrow definition of financial development. We also examine a 
range of alternative measures of de facto financial depth and development, such as the sum 
of stock market capitalization and credit to GDP, the ratio of M2 to GDP etc., as well as 
institutional measures such as creditors’ rights.  
 
b. Institutional quality: The World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) cover six aspects 
of institutional quality: voice and accountability; political instability and violence; 
government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption 
(Kaufmann et al., 2005). We use a simple average of these six indices as a proxy for 
aggregate institutional quality. These data are available only from 1996 and show strong 
persistence across time for each country; hence, we use the average of the available data as 
a fixed institutional variable.    
 
c. Regulation: We use an index of the rigidity of labor regulations from the International 
Finance Corporation’s Doing Business Database. It captures an economy’s ability to adapt   9 
to changing business conditions, including financial flows. These data are available only 
from 2003, so we use the average for each country as a fixed regulation variable. 
 
d. Trade openness: We use the sum of exports and imports of goods and services, expressed 
as a ratio to GDP. We also include a measure of policy openness to trade, defined as the 
proportion of years for which the trade regime is an open one (Wacziarg and Welch, 2003). 
 
e. Macro policies: The monetary and fiscal policy stances are measured by the degree of 
variation in consumer price inflation and the average ratio of government revenue to 
expenditure, respectively, over the relevant period. Whilst these macroeconomic outcomes 
are subject to exogenous shocks, their measurement over five-year periods can provide a 
broad indication of the policy stance.  
 
f. Overall development: We use the level of initial per capita GDP (either at the beginning 
of the sample or the initial year of each five-year period measure). 
 
Our dataset comprises a total of 84 countries. We do not include the transition economies of 
Eastern Europe since their data for the pre-transition years are suspect and we need longer 
time series for our analysis. We also exclude small economies (population under 1 million) 
and a number of poor economies for which data availability, especially on capital flows, is 
limited. The dataset covers the period 1975-2004, giving us a maximum of six non-
overlapping five year-averaged observations for each country.  
 
When presenting basic stylized facts, we group the countries into industrial (21), emerging 
market (21), and other developing countries (42) (see Appendix Table A.1). The emerging 
market countries are those from the group of non-industrial countries that are most 
financially open.
5 This group accounts for the vast majority of capital flows (either net 
inflows or gross inflows plus outflows) into or out of the non-industrial countries. In the 
formal empirical analysis, we do not use these coarse distinctions; instead, we directly 
control for the level of development and the degree of financial openness. Our econometric 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
5 The countries in the group of emerging markets roughly correspond to those included in the MSCI 
Emerging Markets Index. The main differences are that we drop the transition economies because of 
limited data availability and add Singapore and Venezuela.   10 
analysis includes the full sample of countries as it is based on a framework that should be 
consistent across industrial and developing countries. Indeed, for identifying threshold 
effects, it is best to include as many countries as possible at different stages of development.  
 
IV. Empirical Strategy 
We now discuss some issues that we need to confront in our formal empirical analysis and 
describe how we tackle them. Our empirical framework builds on standard cross-country 
growth regressions as we are interested in capturing threshold effects at the national level.
6 
Our focus is on medium- and long-run growth rather than business cycle and other short-run 
fluctuations. Hence, we use five-year averages of the underlying data for our baseline 
results. Business cycles are more persistent in developing economies than in industrial ones 
but a five-year window is a reasonable compromise for filtering out cycles in both types of 
countries (Agenor et al., 2000; Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006). Time averages of the annual 
data also smooth out year-to-year fluctuations in variables such as capital flows.  
 
We use two broad categories of cross-country econometric models to investigate potential 
thresholds in the relationship between financial openness and growth. Both methods attempt 
to explain a country’s growth over a five-year period,  it y   , as a function of a set of standard 
controls for growth models, xit , country and time period specific effects, δi and γt 
respectively, financial openness, FOit , and its relationship with a threshold variable, THit: 
 
it t i it it it it   ) , , TH , FO , f(x     y       + =    
 
where i indexes the country and t the time period, and  it    is an idiosyncratic error term.  
 
The first approach we consider is parametric--a standard linear dynamic panel data model 
with various interaction functions between the threshold and financial openness variables. 
The second approach is a semi-parametric one--a partial linear model wherein the 
relationship between growth and the standard controls plus fixed effects is assumed to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
6 We are aware of concerns of authors such as Durlauf, Johnson and Temple (2005) about cross-
country growth regressions. Our view is that, despite their limitations, these regressions can help 
develop some useful policy messages related to threshold conditions for financial integration.    11 
linear but the relationship between growth and the financial openness and threshold 
variables is modelled as a nonparametric function.  
 
A. Parametric approach 
The dynamic linear panel data model is of the following form: 
 
it it it it t i it   ) TH , g(FO x'   y         + + + + =    
where θ is a vector of coefficients on the set of standard controls and where the vector of 
standard controls xit includes the initial income per capita levels. A key empirical issue is 
how to define the thresholds relationship in the function g(FOit,THit). Based on the literature 
cited earlier, we explore three specific parametric assumptions for this function:
7 
 
a.  A linear interaction between financial openness and the threshold variable: 
 
    + + = it it FOTH it TH it FO it it TH FO     TH        FO   ) TH , g(FO        
 
This approach tests if the level of a particular variable affects the marginal effect of 
financial openness on growth. The specification we employ implies that the marginal effect 
(either positive or negative) of financial openness on growth is larger at higher levels of the 
threshold variable.  
 






THsq it it FOTH it TH it FO it it TH FO       TH   TH FO     TH        FO   ) TH , g(FO           + +     + + =  
 
This allows for the possibility that, beyond a certain level, the threshold variable becomes 
more or less important in determining the marginal effect of financial openness on growth.  
 
c.  A high-low cut-off based on the sample median of a threshold variable: 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
7 These are among the most widely used parametric specifications in the literature. Other approaches 
include interactions of capital account openness with cubic terms in institutional quality, with a 
quadratic spline or with quantile dummies for institutional quality (Klein, 2005).   12 
 
it TH t it it FOTHhigh it FO it it TH   ) THmedian (TH FO        FO   ) TH , g(FO       +   > + = D  
 
where  ) THmedian (TH t it > D  is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
threshold variable for a country is above the median value for all countries in that time 
period. 
 
This approach sets the threshold exogenously and provides a simple way of testing if the 
level of a particular variable matters in terms of the quantitative effect of openness on 
growth outcomes. We also examine the impact of varying the high-low cut-off to check the 
appropriateness of the median approach.
8  
 
The interpretation of reduced-form growth regressions is typically bedevilled by concerns 
about endogeneity and the direction of causality. For instance, capital may flow 
disproportionately to fast-growing economies, making financial integration dependent on 
growth rather than the reverse. Similarly, financial development and growth may both be 
driven by common factors such as the legal or broader institutional frameworks. It is 
difficult to come up with convincing and effective instruments to deal with these issues. 
 
Hence, we use system generalized method of moments (GMM) techniques for dynamic 
panels to get around these problems. This involves estimating a system comprising a first-
differenced equation to eliminate country fixed effects and an additional equation in levels. 
Appropriately lagged values of levels and first-differences, respectively, can then be used as 
instruments in these equations to address endogeneity concerns. This approach is 
increasingly being used in a variety of related contexts.
9 In addition to the system GMM 
estimation we also provide basic fixed effects estimates as a consistency check. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
8 An alternative approach would be to use sample-splitting methodologies to endogenously 
determine the threshold (Hansen, 2000). Unfortunately, however, such models cannot be applied to 
the dynamic panel approach that we employ.  
9 See Bond et al., 2001, for a detailed technical discussion of its application to empirical growth 
models. In related work, Chang et al. (2005) use this methodology to explore linear interaction 
effects of institutional features and trade openness. Aghion et al. (2005) look at interaction effects 
between financial development and the exchange rate regime. Roodman (2006, 2008) provides a 
detailed review of the practical implementation of this methodology in a manner that obviates 
potential concerns related to its somewhat mechanical application and small sample problems.   13 
B. Semi-parametric approaches 
Next, we turn to a nonparametric technique that allows us to model in a more flexible 
manner the relationship between growth, on the one hand, and the financial openness and 
threshold variables on the other. To keep the model tractable, we assume that the 
relationship between growth and the standard controls plus fixed effects is linear as before. 
The resulting semiparametric model is written as follows:  
 
it it it it t i it   ) TH , h(FO x'   y         + + + + =    
where we estimate the parametric coefficients and the nonparametric relationship 
) TH , h(FO it it .  
 
A few recent papers in the growth literature have used partial linear models to examine the 
relationship between growth and a regressor of interest. For example, Banerjee and Duflo 
(2003) examine the nonparametric effects of inequality on growth while Imbs and Ranciere 
(2007) look at the relationship between external debt and growth. However, these papers 
focus on the relationship between growth and a nonparametric function of a single variable 
rather than a function of two variables as is the case with the interaction effects we consider.  
 
Yatchew (1998, 2003) provides a detailed guide to a variety of methods that can be 
employed to estimate the parametric coefficients and the nonparametric function 
) TH , h(FO it it .
10 In particular, as in Banerjee and Duflo (2003) and Imbs and Ranciere 
(2007), we focus on Robinson’s (1988) double residuals approach. This involves two 
stages. First, nonparametric regressions of growth and each of the other control variables on 
financial openness and the threshold variable are estimated to give  ) TH , FO   |   y E( it it it    and 
) TH , FO   |   E( it it it z  where  it z  denotes the matrix of  it x  plus the fixed effects with 
corresponding vector of coefficients   . Various nonparametric estimation methodologies 
can be employed, for example local regression or kernel estimation. The residuals from 
these regressions are then used to estimate the parametric coefficients    using an OLS 
regression: 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
10 See also Yatchew and No (2001) for estimation of a partial linear model with two variables 
entering the nonparametric expression. We implement these partial linear estimations using S-plus 
coding following the examples in Yatchew (2003).    14 
it it it it it
it it it it it it it it it it
  ))' TH , FO   |   E(z   - (
) TH , h(FO -   )' TH , FO   |   E(z   - y      ) TH , FO   |   y E( -   y
   
 
+ =




These OLS estimates of    ˆ    can then be used to construct an expression for the residual 
growth with the estimated parametric effects removed:  
 
it it it it it   ) TH , h(FO     ˆ z' -   y     +      
 
The nonparametric form of  ) TH , h(FO it it  can be estimated using standard methods such as 
local regression. For details on the required assumptions and convergence properties, see 
Robinson (1988) and Yatchew (2003). We use OLS regressions in the different stages of the 
partial linear estimation, with time and country fixed effects included where appropriate.
11 
 
The use of semi-parametric methods allows for a more flexible examination of the nature of 
threshold effects in the relationship between financial openness and growth than is possible 
with parametric approaches. However, there are trade-offs among different approaches. For 
example, the flexibility of the semi-parametric estimates comes with other assumptions, 
such as that of a linear relationship for other control variables and the choice of the nature 
of the nonparametric estimation approach. More importantly, nonparametric relationships 
are somewhat more difficult to interpret and to translate into policy implications. 
 
A key issue concerns the significance and empirical content of the estimated thresholds. To 
have policy relevance, our analysis requires more than just a demonstration of statistically 
significant conditional correlations between certain variables and growth. We need to 
construct confidence intervals around our estimates of the marginal effects of openness on 
growth, conditional on a particular level of a given threshold variable. We also need to 
know if the magnitudes of the threshold effects are economically significant and if the 
estimated thresholds lie within the range of the sample used in the estimation (otherwise, 
the thresholds would be of little practical value in terms of understanding differential 
growth outcomes). 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
11 As discussed below, in the case of the non time-varying institutional quality index we do not 
include country dummies in the nonparametric estimation.   15 
V. Basic Results 
We motivate our empirical analysis by documenting a set of stylized facts for data averaged 
over the full sample period. We then present our baseline econometric results that rely on a 
finer temporal breakdown of the data. As much of the existing literature has analyzed the 
interaction between financial openness and financial development, we will focus our initial 
exposition on the latter as a threshold variable in order to illustrate our framework. 
 
V.1 Stylized facts 
We begin by exploring if there are obvious threshold effects in the data. For this exercise, 
we limit the sample to non-industrial countries split into two groups—emerging markets 
(EMs) and other developing countries (ODCs). Our interest is in whether, within each of 
these groups, the levels of certain variables are associated with differences in average 
growth rates. Table 1 compares unconditional and conditional growth rates over the period 
1975-2004 for countries that are above or below the within-group sample medians for 
different variables that have been posited as threshold variables. After sorting countries 
within each group by these group-specific thresholds, we then report cross-sectional 
averages within each cell.  
 
There are three main results that can be gleaned from this table. First, EMs, which are more 
integrated into international capital markets than ODCs, have a higher average growth rate 
than ODCs over the period 1975-2004, but this effect becomes smaller when we control for 
other standard variables that influence growth. Second, unconditional growth rates in EMs 
are greater for those countries with higher (within-group above-median) levels of the 
illustrative threshold indicators for financial depth, trade openness, institutional quality, 
regulation and macro policies, although this difference is not always statistically significant. 
These effects are less pronounced in ODCs, except that the institutional quality threshold is 
even more important for ODCs than for EMs. The picture is less clear when looking at 
overall development and financial openness as threshold variables. Growth rates are higher 
for countries with lower initial GDP per capita, reflecting convergence effects. In both 
groups, growth rates are higher for countries with lower relative financial openness. 
Third, for conditional growth rates the patterns are less pronounced, although the positive 
association of growth with higher values of certain threshold variables persists (e.g., private 
credit, trade, reduced regulation and lower inflation variability among EMs). Table 1 also   16 
suggests that the difference between the growth rates of EMs and ODCs is generally more 
pronounced at higher levels of the threshold variables (except for institutional quality, GDP 
per capita and financial openness). These stylized facts are suggestive of systematic 
threshold or conditioning effects in the relationship between financial openness and growth. 
We now turn to a more formal empirical analysis of these effects. 
 
V.2 Basic empirical analysis 
Our regression analysis is based on five-year averages of the underlying annual data. We 
begin with a limited set of controls that have been identified in the literature as being 
relatively robust determinants of long-term per capita GDP growth—initial income (at the 
start of each five-year period), which picks up convergence effects; the level of investment 
to GDP; a proxy for human capital; and population growth.  
 
We report the results of baseline growth regressions using these controls in the first panel of 
Table 2. The first column shows the results of OLS regressions with country fixed effects 
(FE). The population growth rate does not seem to matter for medium-term growth. 
However, when we switch to generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation to deal 
with endogeneity issues (column 2), only the level of investment remains statistically 
significant. Nevertheless, we retain these four controls in the first stage of our analysis. FE 
and GMM are the two basic specifications that we will build upon in our further analysis.
12  
 
V.2.1 Financial depth as a threshold 
In panel 2, we include a broad measure of de facto financial openness. As is typical in the 
literature, we find that the correlation between financial integration and growth is weak or 
even slightly negative. This highlights the key discrepancy between theory and evidence on 
the growth effects of financial integration. Consider a simple exercise where we look at 
whether the correlation is different between countries with high and low levels of financial 
depth (above or below the sample median). The third panel of Table 2 shows that there is a 
striking difference. When we interact the indicator for a high degree of financial depth with 
the financial openness variable, the coefficient on the interaction term is strongly positive 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
12 Both specifications always include time effects to capture common factors affecting growth across 
all countries in each five-year period.    17 
and nearly the same in magnitude as the negative coefficient on the financial openness 
variable itself. In other words, the effect of financial openness is negative for economies 
with comparatively low levels of financial depth and slightly positive but insignificant for 
those with higher levels.
13 Repeating the experiment using different percentiles of the 
financial depth variable rather than the median as the cutoff yields similar positive 
significant interaction coefficients for cutoffs from the 15
th to the 60
th percentile with FE 
estimates and from the 30
th to the 65
th percentile with GMM estimates (see Figure 2). 
 
In panel 4, we allow for a linear interaction term between domestic financial depth and 
financial openness. Neither the coefficient on financial openness nor the one on the 
interaction term is significantly different from zero. The level of financial depth does not 
seem to matter for the correlation between financial openness and growth. Could this non-
result be driven by the fact that, once a country has attained a certain level of financial 
depth, further improvements don’t matter that much? 
 
In panel 5, we allow for an additional interaction of financial openness with the square of 
the financial depth variable. The coefficients on both the linear and quadratic interactions 
are now strongly significant in both the FE and GMM estimates, with the first coefficient 
being positive and the second negative in both cases. That is, greater financial depth leads to 
an improvement in the growth effects of financial integration but only up to a certain level 
of financial depth.  
 
Where is the threshold and is it an economically reasonable one? We can calculate the level 
of the threshold, for a given level of credit to GDP, from the interaction terms. The overall 
financial openness coefficient in this case takes an inverted U-shape as the threshold 
variable rises. It is thus possible to calculate the cutoffs at which its sign changes. Based on 
the FE estimates, the threshold level below which the marginal effect of financial openness 
on growth is negative corresponds to a credit to GDP ratio of 71 percent (-0.0825 + 
0.1761*0.71 – 0.0845*0.71^2 = 0). Above this level, the coefficient is positive before 
turning negative for credit to GDP above 137 percent. Based on the GMM estimates, the 
corresponding threshold levels are credit to GDP ratios of 50 percent and 126 percent, 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
13 The median levels of financial development that determine the high-low cutoffs are calculated 
separately for each period.   18 
respectively. For reference, the median levels of credit to GDP for industrial countries, EMs 
and ODCs are 0.71, 0.32 and 0.19, respectively (calculated across all period-country 
observations for each group). 
 
With both estimation methods, the vast majority (over 90%) of ODC observations lie below 
the lower threshold and have a negative financial openness coefficient. For emerging and 
industrial economies, a much higher fraction of observations lie between the lower and 
upper thresholds and have a positive financial openness coefficient: about two-fifths for 
emerging economies and four-fifths for industrial countries (relative to the GMM-based 
threshold). Thus, the threshold level seems plausible and of practical relevance for 
developing countries contemplating capital account liberalization. In the remaining 




Since the threshold we have derived is static, it is interesting to see how different groups of 
countries are doing relative to this threshold over time.
15 In 1975-79, the proportion of 
countries in each group above the GMM-based lower threshold (private credit to GDP ratio 
of 0.50) was as follows: industrial countries—62 percent; emerging markets—25 percent; 
and ODCs—2 percent. By 2000-04, the proportions had increased to 100 percent, 48 
percent and 14 percent, respectively. Figure 3 shows how the credit to GDP ratio has 
changed for each of the emerging market countries from 1985-89 to 2000-04, and how these 
levels match up against the estimated FE and GMM thresholds. For most of the emerging 
markets, the data points lie above the 45-degree line, implying increases in financial depth 
over time by this measure. The fraction of emerging markets above the GMM threshold 
rises from 25% in 1975-79 to 48% in 2000-04, while the number above the FE threshold 
goes from 0% to 38%. It is worth noting that a country like China comes out looking very 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
14 The upper threshold is an artifact of the quadratic specification. We experimented with the 
inclusion of higher order polynomials of the threshold variable (and corresponding interactions with 
financial openness). The coefficients on the higher order terms were usually not statistically 
significant but their magnitudes generally showed a flattening out of (rather than a decline in) the 
implied marginal effect of financial openness on growth at high levels of the threshold variable. This 
is another reason why we focus on the lower threshold.  
15 An important issue here is whether the thresholds themselves change over time. This is not an 
easy question to address in an empirical framework that uses cross-country data and, therefore, 
comes up against obvious data limitations. We leave this for future work and note that our exercise 
here is meant only to be illustrative of the empirical content of the thresholds concept.    19 
good by this measure despite the weaknesses in its financial sector, which is dominated by 
state-owned banks. This is a useful reminder of the potential pitfalls of using a particular 
uni-dimensional measure of financial development. And of course the worldwide crisis that 
first hit the U.S. and then spread to other industrial countries has shown that financial depth 
is not equivalent to financial stability.  
 
V.2.2 Robustness of financial depth threshold  
We test the sensitivity of our baseline results for the financial depth threshold in a number 
of ways. First, we use a different set of basic controls and redo the regressions in Table 2. 
We retain log initial income and the education variable, and add the following controls—
trade openness, CPI inflation, and the logarithm of the number of phone lines per capita (a 
proxy for the level of infrastructure). We do not present the results here, but they were quite 
similar in terms of the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients of interest. The implied 
upper and lower thresholds from the FE specification with quadratic interactions are private 
credit to GDP ratios of 63 percent and 148 percent, respectively (compared to 71 percent 
and 137 percent based on the results in Table 2). For the GMM specification the results are 
such that, while the estimated overall financial openness coefficient retains an inverted U-
shape, it remains positive and does not cut the x-axis. 
 
Second, we use an alternative measure of financial depth—the sum of private credit and 
stock market capitalization as a ratio to GDP. Unfortunately, given the absence of stock 
markets in many of the developing countries, especially in the early years of the sample, the 
sample drops to about half the original size. In the specification with quadratic interactions, 
the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms have the same sign as in our baseline, but 
they are smaller and not statistically significant. Given the low levels of stock market 
development in ODCs and, until recently, in emerging markets as well, this broader 
measure of financial depth does not seem to be useful for constructing thresholds. 
 
Third, we check if the results are driven by the choice of countries in our sample. We test 
for robustness to the exclusion of three groups of countries (dropping one group at a time): 
(i) OPEC countries (Algeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, UAE and Venezuela); (ii) 
offshore financial centers (Ireland, Panama, Singapore); and (iii) countries hit by the Asian 
financial crisis (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand). The results with the   20 
high-low interactions and linear interactions were broadly similar when we excluded these 
sub-samples. Table 3 shows that the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients, as well as the 
implied thresholds, are relatively stable when we drop each of these groups of countries, 
suggesting that the results are not being driven by outliers or any specific group of 
countries.  
 
Fourth, we go back to the original financial depth variable but look at alternative measures 
of financial openness (FO). The threshold value of private credit to GDP is almost 
unchanged when we use the stock of gross external liabilities as a ratio to GDP—rather than 
the sum of external assets and liabilities--as the measure of FO (0.51 in the GMM estimates, 
which is almost identical to the baseline result from Table 2). 
 
V.3 Breaking down the nature of financial integration  
The literature on financial flows makes a distinction between FDI and portfolio equity 
flows, on the one hand, and debt on the other. It is generally believed that the former types 
of flows generate more of the indirect benefits of financial integration and also have fewer 
risks than debt. Does the composition of external liabilities (or flows) influence the 
threshold level of financial depth? Here we obtain a very interesting result (Table 4, Part A). 
When we measure FO as the stock of FDI plus portfolio equity liabilities, the threshold is 
lower (credit to GDP ratios of 58 percent and 34 percent for the FE and GMM estimates, 
respectively). By contrast, when we use debt liabilities, the threshold is much higher (credit 
to GDP ratios of 75 percent and 55 percent for the FE and GMM estimates, respectively). 
That is, the risks of financial integration seem to be lower when it takes the form of FDI or 
portfolio equity liabilities. When debt liabilities constitute the primary form of financial 
integration, the level of financial depth necessary for financial integration to have growth 
benefits is much higher.  
 
The results with flows are more mixed (Table 4, Part B). When we use total inflows, the 
signs of the interaction effects are such that the overall financial openness coefficient has a 
U-shape as credit to GDP rises, the reverse of the results with the stock measures of 
openness. Again, there is a dramatic difference between the results when we use FDI plus 
portfolio equity inflows versus debt inflows. In the former case, the inverted U-shape of the 
overall financial openness coefficient remains (although insignificant with the GMM   21 
estimates). By contrast, the results with debt inflows correspond to those for total inflows 
(as expected, given the high share of debt to total inflows over the sample period). In this 
case, the impact of financial openness on growth is estimated to be positive for lower or 
particularly high levels of financial depth but negative at intermediate levels. This result is 
consistent with models of potential instability induced by greater capital inflows in 
economies at an intermediate level of financial development (e.g., Aghion et al., 2004). 
 
VI. Alternative Thresholds 
Our focus has so far been on the financial depth threshold. We now examine threshold 
effects based on a range of other indicators suggested by the discussion of theoretical 
models in Section 2. We maintain the FE and GMM specifications as our benchmarks and 
focus on the quadratic interaction specifications. 
 
The first panel of Table 5 repeats the results for the financial depth variable. The second 
panel looks at a composite measure of institutional quality (IQ). Many authors have argued 
that IQ is a crucial determinant of growth and volatility, especially crises (e.g., Acemoglu et 
al., 2003). There is indeed a clear threshold effect that we can identify; the interactions of 
financial openness with the level and squared level of the IQ variable are statistically 
significant. All of the industrial country observations (five-year averages) exceed the 
estimated threshold, while only 29 percent of emerging market observations and about 20 
percent of ODC observations do. By this measure, most developing countries are below the 
level of IQ at which the marginal benefits of increasing financial openness become 
apparent.  
 
We also looked at some of the constituents of the composite measure of institutional 
quality—level of corruption, cost of enforcing debt contracts etc.—but could not identify 
any strong threshold effects based on these components of the IQ indicator (results not 
shown). The level of per capita income (on an internationally comparable basis) is often 
seen as a composite index that proxies for a variety of factors that have been found to boost 
growth. But there is no clear threshold effect based on this variable.  
 
We can identify a threshold based on trade openness (the ratio of the sum of imports and 
exports to GDP) but the estimated threshold is so high that few countries meet this 
threshold. We also experimented with a policy measure of trade openness (results not   22 
reported here). The relevant interaction coefficients were significant in the FE regressions 
but not in GMM. We also looked at thresholds based on a measure of structural policies—
labor market flexibility—and two measures of macro policies—inflation volatility and the 
ratio of government revenues to expenditures. There are a number of significant interaction 
terms in the regressions with these variables, but they are in general not robust, so we 
choose not to focus on the implied thresholds.  
 
To visually examine how the estimated thresholds look for a few key variables, Figure 4 
plots the overall (including interactions) financial openness coefficient estimates against 
different values of the relevant threshold variable. Private credit and IQ illustrate the 
inverted U-shaped relationship, with the standard error bands often encompassing zero but 
still leaving some empirical content in this threshold measure. When we use trade openness 
or the log of initial income, the threshold effects are essentially linear in the relevant range. 
 
The analysis in this section suggests that, at a first pass, the results for financial and 
institutional development are more supportive of the presence of threshold effects. Other 
variables we have looked at also hint at threshold effects, particularly for high/low 




VII. Results Based on Semi-parametric Approaches 
We now explore the relationship between financial openness and growth using the semi-
parametric methods outlined in Section IV. To illustrate these methods, we first start with a 
univariate nonparametric specification in the partial linear setup. That is, we look at the 
potential nonlinear relationship between growth and financial openness itself. We then 
examine interaction effects between financial openness and various threshold variables.
17  
                                                                                                                                                                                            
16 We also experimented with using the de jure measure of financial openness as a threshold variable 
in place of the de facto measure. The coefficient on gross financial openness is positive at higher 
levels of financial openness, although the coefficient is significant only in the FE estimates.  
17 To conserve space, we present only the key results in figures. Figures for all other results referred 
to in this section are in the Semi-Parametric Appendix of the web link to the working paper version 
of this paper.   23 
VII.1 Semiparametric estimation of the effects of financial openness on growth 
The regressions of growth against the baseline controls plus gross financial openness to 
GDP indicate an insignificant negative coefficient on the latter from both the FE and system 
GMM estimation (Table 4). However, unconditional plots suggest that the level and shape 
of the relationship between financial openness and growth vary by quintile of financial 
openness. To investigate this in more detail, we employ the partial linear model with the 
gross financial openness variable alone entering the specification nonparametrically.  
 
First, we run a regression to eliminate the baseline parametric effects (including country and 
time fixed effects) from the growth data.
18 Figure 5 plots growth residuals from this 
regression against the gross financial openness variable. Next, we use nonparametric 
methods to estimate the form of the relationship between these two variables. Specifically, 
we employ the Robinson residual method, first using local regression with two different 
spans (the percentage of data points included in the local regression) and then a kernel 
estimator (with a triangular kernel) as the nonparametric technique. We also use an 
alternative “differencing approach” (for details, see the Semi-Parametric Appendix in the 
web link to the working paper version). If we demean the growth estimates from the first-
stage parametric regressions, we obtain “purged” or demeaned growth residual values that 
illustrate the nonparametric relationship at the mean of the parametric variables (Yatchew, 
2003). These different relationships are illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure 5. 
 
These plots illustrate a similar pattern in the results from different approaches, with an 
increasing relationship between growth and financial openness at low levels of the latter, 
which then turns negative and reverts to being positive at the highest levels of financial 
openness. However, the estimated relationship becomes insignificant as financial openness 
rises. The plots also highlight the potential roles of outliers on financial openness in 
influencing the results and the relatively large confidence intervals attached to the point 
estimates. The variations in the effects across financial openness values may contribute to 
the overall negative insignificant coefficient in the standard linear parametric estimation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
18 Note that the baseline parametric effects exclude the indirect influence of the financial openness 
on these variables.   24 
We replicated the above analysis for different measures of financial openness. As with the 
parametric results, there are marked differences across these measures. For example, the 
stock of FDI and portfolio equity liabilities, which has a positive but insignificant linear 
coefficient in the parametric setup (see Table 4), has a relationship that is broadly flat at 
positive values of the demeaned growth residuals and then increases with the financial 
openness measure. In contrast, the relationship of the debt measure with the demeaned 
growth residuals has a marked downward slope above a certain value of debt (Imbs and 
Ranciere, 2007, discuss the external debt Laffer curve). 
 
VII.2 Semiparametric interactions between financial openness and threshold variables  
The double residuals approach is applied in a similar manner when looking at interaction 
effects, i.e., when both financial openness and a threshold variable enter nonparametrically. 
As before, we first obtain growth residuals by eliminating the baseline parametric effects. 
To conduct the nonparametric smoothing, we then focus on the local regression estimator.
19  
 
Unconditional plots of growth against financial openness reveal patterns that vary by the 
level of credit to GDP. At low levels of credit to GDP, the relationship tends to be negative, 
then moving towards a flat relationship at higher levels of credit to GDP. Using the double 
residual approach with a local regression span of 0.75, the estimated nonparametric 
relationship between growth residuals and financial openness is illustrated in Figure 6.
20 
This figure is similar to Figure 6 but, rather than showing the univariate nonparametric 
relationship between growth residuals and financial openness, it shows the multivariate 
relationship of growth residuals with financial openness and the credit to GDP ratio. Thus, it 
represents one nonparametric approach to illustrating the interaction between financial 
openness and a threshold variable in their relationship with growth residuals. For relatively 
low levels of credit to GDP and low levels of financial openness, the estimated relationship 
between growth and financial openness is indeed negative. This is the range in which most 
country observations actually fall.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
19 This fits a local quadratic regression including the threshold and financial openness variables, 
their squares and cross-products. Insightful Corporation (2007) has details on local regression 
procedures. 
20 The results were not greatly sensitive to alternative regression spans.    25 
An alternative way to examine this relationship is to look at how the relationship of the 
demeaned growth residuals with financial openness varies with the level of the threshold 
variable (and vice versa). Figure 7 shows such relationships and their confidence intervals 
for different slices of the corresponding 3D plot. Figure 7a illustrates the negative 
relationship between demeaned growth residuals and financial openness at low levels of 
credit to GDP. Figure 7b shows that the inverted U-shaped relationship between these 
residuals and credit-to-GDP tends to be more prevalent at higher levels of financial 
openness. One point to note concerning these plots is that the slices are taken at equally 
spaced splits across the full range rather than at percentile values of the distribution of 
observations. Thus, given the skewed distribution of both credit to GDP and financial 
openness most country data points lie in the bottom and left-hand side plots. Again, these 
plots illustrate the wide confidence intervals around the estimated effects, which in many 
cases are not significantly different from zero. 
 
This analysis can be repeated for different measures of financial openness. As with the 
parametric estimates, the results for total liabilities are similar to those for the gross 
measures. There are again marked differences between the estimates using FDI and 
portfolio equity liabilities versus debt liabilities (results not shown here). With the former, 
the unconditional relationship between growth and financial openness is mostly flat or 
slightly positive throughout different sub-samples based on levels of credit to GDP. By 
contrast, with debt liabilities the relationship with growth is downward sloping for half of 
the sub-samples with lower levels of credit to GDP.  
 
Turning to the nonparametric model, Figures 8 and 9 compare the fitted nonparametric 
interaction effects and the demeaned growth residuals. For low to medium levels of credit to 
GDP, the relationship between growth and the financial openness measure based on FDI 
and portfolio equity liabilities is flat or increasing. However, at these low levels of credit to 
GDP, the relationship between growth and debt liabilities is negative. Again, when 
analyzing these results it is important to note that the confidence intervals around these 
estimates tend to be relatively large and that most observations lie at lower levels of 
financial openness and credit to GDP. 
   26 
We now apply this methodology to a few other threshold variables.
21 Unconditional growth 
plots illustrate that the relationship between growth and financial openness is negative for 
samples with lower trade openness ratios. This effect disappears once we control for other 
growth determinants and fixed effects in estimating the nonparametric interaction 
relationship with the relationship between residual growth and financial openness broadly 
flat at different levels of trade. 
 
Turning to institutional quality, again unconditional plots indicate a negative relationship 
between growth and financial openness at lower levels of the threshold variable. At low 
levels of institutional quality, the relationship between gross financial openness and growth 
is U-shaped. However, at higher levels of institutional quality the relationship becomes 
more linear. In line with the quadratic parametric estimation, for a given level of financial 
openness, residual growth increases with institutional quality at a decreasing rate. Once 
again, the interpretation of these results is subject to caveats on the size of confidence 




VIII. Summary and Implications 
Recent advances in the theoretical and empirical literatures indicate that the benefits of 
financial integration may be far subtler than had been presumed earlier. A new framework 
for analyzing financial globalization highlights the tension between the indirect benefits of 
financial integration and the potential risks if a country opens up to capital flows without 
the right initial conditions in place. From a practical policy perspective, however, a 
reasonable evaluation of the cost-benefit trade-off requires a better understanding of what 
these initial conditions are and how exactly they matter. This is an essential component of 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
21 See Semi-Parametric Appendix Figures 14-15 and 16-19 for trade openness and institutional 
quality as the threshold variables, respectively (this appendix is in the web link to the working paper 
version). 
22 The double residual estimation process is complicated in this case by the non time-varying nature 
of the threshold variable. In the first stage nonparametric estimation we have been conducting 
nonparametric regression of each of the baseline controls, including country dummy variables, on 
the threshold and financial openness variables. Applying this technique with institutional quality 
would mean that the country dummy variables are regressed on institutional quality, which is also a 
country-specific time invariant variable. This leads to a singular regressor matrix in the second stage 
regression. To get around this problem, we remove fixed effects from the first stage regression. We 
then estimate the second stage nonparametric interaction effects also without the country dummy 
variables (although we obtain similar results if we then include them).   27 
an analytical framework that can take account of country-specific features and initial 
conditions in designing a pragmatic approach to capital account liberalization (Prasad and 
Rajan, 2008).  
 
In this paper, we have tried to put some empirical structure on the concept of threshold 
conditions in order to give policymakers guidance on this issue. For instance, our results 
support the widely held conjecture that FDI and portfolio equity flows are safer than debt 
flows at low levels of financial and institutional development. We do not claim to have 
identified definitive thresholds. Our main contribution, instead, has been to develop an 
empirical structure to address this issue and frame it in a more concrete and tractable 
manner. Our analysis has already generated a number of interesting findings, which we now 
briefly summarize before discussing what policymakers should make of them. 
 
Based on different methodologies and different definitions of thresholds, we conclude that 
there are threshold levels of certain variables that are important determinants of the 
relationship between financial integration and growth. In our empirical work, we have 
focused on a few variables motivated by the existing theoretical literature. These include 
domestic financial market development (in particular, the depth of credit markets), 
institutional quality, trade openness, labor market rigidities, and the overall level of 
development. All of these seem to be relevant threshold variables, with varying degrees of 
importance—the most clearly-defined thresholds are based on the financial depth and 
institutional quality variables. We find that many of these thresholds are much lower when 
we measure financial integration by the stocks of FDI and portfolio equity liabilities rather 
than debt liabilities. 
 
The confidence intervals around some of the estimated thresholds are large, but in many 
cases the estimated coefficients yield reasonably tight estimates of the threshold conditions. 
Do the thresholds have empirical content? Our results generally indicate that the estimated 
thresholds are reasonable and well within the ranges of the data samples. For instance, most 
industrial countries and a few emerging markets are above the estimated threshold levels of 
financial depth, while a majority of emerging markets and nearly all other developing 
countries are below them. This result is consistent with observed differences in growth 
outcomes associated with financial integration across these groups of countries. Of course,   28 
the recent global crisis shows that financial depth is not a reliable measure of financial 
stability, which should also take into account regulatory and supervisory structures.  
 
Indeed, there is a rich research agenda that comes out of our work. Future theoretical studies 
in this area should focus on the precise nature of the threshold relationship and provide 
testable predictions in the context of reduced form solutions. On the empirical front, our 
results show that focusing on individual threshold variables could lead to misleading 
conclusions. Some of the open questions prompted by our analysis are as follows. Are there 
trade-offs among different threshold conditions, such that a high level of one variable can 
lower the threshold on another variable?
23 If the level of financial integration itself acts as a 
threshold, how can it be integrated into the framework based on other thresholds laid out in 
this paper? Have the levels of different thresholds been changing over time as virtually all 
countries become more financially open in de facto terms, irrespective of their capital 
control regimes? How do circumstances in global financial markets affect the thresholds? 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
23 We find preliminary evidence that financial depth matters less in countries that have high IQ 
levels. We also checked if a simple composite measure derived from the different threshold 
variables in our analysis could serve as a composite threshold indicator. Preliminary analysis 
suggests that there are indeed threshold effects in the data based on this composite indicator. We 
have not, however, developed a procedure to find the optimal composite indicator that captures the 
complementarity and substitutability among different threshold conditions and leave that for future 
work.   29 
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Figure 2. High/Low Interaction Coefficients for Gross Financial Openness and Private 
Credit to GDP at Different Sample Splits 
A. Fixed effects specification 
 




Notes: Specifications include base controls of Panel 3 of Table 2. Percentile cutoffs calculated for each period 
on the basis of the distribution of private credit observations in that period. 
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Figure 3. Average Private Credit to GDP Relative to Estimated Thresholds: 
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Notes: Thresholds taken from quadratic interaction specification in Table 2, Panel 5.   36 
Figure 4. Overall Financial Openness Coefficient Against Alternative Threshold 
Variables (based on GMM estimation) 
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Notes: The plots illustrate the relationship between five-year growth rates--once standard controls and dummy 
variables have been controlled for (excluding the indirect effect of gross financial openness on these controls--
and gross financial openness. A nonparametric relationship is then estimated and illustrated on the graph with 
95% confidence intervals indicated by vertical lines. Four alternative methods are illustrated. Three employ 
the Robinson double residual estimator including local regression estimator (loess) using various spans of the 
observations and a kernel smoother. The final one employs the differencing estimator described in the Semi-
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Figure 6. Double Residual Nonparametric Interaction Effects 





Notes: This plot illustrates the estimated nonparametric relationship between conditional growth once standard 
controls and dummy variables have been controlled for (excluding the indirect effect of gross financial 
openness and credit-to-GDP on these controls) and gross financial openness and credit-to-GDP. The Robinson 
double residual estimator is employed using a local regression estimator (loess) with a span of 0.75.  
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Figure 7. Cross-Sections of Double Residual Nonparametric Interaction Effects  
(Credit to GDP as the threshold variable, interacted with gross financial openness to GDP) 
 
A. Sliced at different values of credit to GDP 
 
B. Sliced at different values of financial openness to GDP 
 
 
Notes: The six lower panels show the relationship between residual growth and financial openness in part (a) 
and credit to GDP in part (b) with 95% confidence intervals indicated by the vertical lines. The six plots are 
taken at six equally spaced levels of credit-to-GDP and financial openness to GDP in parts A and B, 
respectively. The lowest value of the given variable is represented in the bottom left-hand panel with the level 
rising in subsequent panels as one moves from left to right and then up and long the second panel. The 
corresponding values of the given variable at which the slices are made are indicated by the dots in the 
uppermost plot across the width of the figure.   40 
Figure 8. Double Residual Nonparametric Interaction Effects 
(Credit to GDP as the threshold variable, interacted with gross FDI and portfolio equity liabilities to 
GDP) 
Note: Similar to Figure 6 but with FDI and portfolio equity liabilities to GDP as the financial openness 
variable rather than gross financial openness to GDP. 
 
Figure 9. Double Residual Nonparametric Interaction Effects 
(Credit to GDP as the threshold variable, interacted with gross external debt liabilities to GDP) 
 
 
Note: Similar to Figures 6 and 8 but with external debt liabilities to GDP used as the financial openness 
variable.    41 
Table 1. Long-term Growth in Emerging Markets and Other Developing Countries 
 
   
Unconditional growth (% per 
annum) 
Conditional growth (% per 
annum) 
    EM  ODCs  EMs  ODCs 









Splitting sub-samples:           


















Difference in means  1.668*  -0.327  0.557  -0.191 
By average WBGI 


















Difference in means  0.251  0.795*  -0.089  1.057** 


















Difference in means  1.218  0.508  0.388  0.577 
By  rigidity  of 


















Difference in means  1.414  -0.003  0.257  0.333 


















Difference in means  2.303***  1.294***  1.329***  1.239*** 


















Difference in means  -2.253***  -0.044  -1.159**  0.611 
By de jure financial 


















Difference in means  -1.427  -0.171  -0.751  0.353 
By de facto gross financial 


















Difference in means  -1.493*  -0.164  -0.774  -0.008 
 
Notes: The numbers shown are average annual growth rates (medians are shown in parentheses below the 
means). The symbols *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent 
levels, respectively, of a t-test of mean equality across sub-samples. High/low sub-samples are defined relative 
to medians within groupings. See Appendix Table A.1 for definition of emerging market (EM) and other 
developing country (ODC) sub-samples and Appendix Table A.2 for variable definitions. Conditional growth 
indicates residuals from a cross-section regression of growth on log initial GDP per capita, average investment 
to GDP, average years of schooling and average population growth rate.    42 
Table 2. Interactions of Private Credit and Gross Financial Openness to GDP 
 
  [1] Base     [2] With FO    [3] High/low interaction  [4] Linear interaction  [5] Quadratic interaction 
  FE  Sys GMM  FE  Sys GMM  FE  Sys GMM  FE  Sys GMM  FE  Sys GMM 
-0.2769  -0.0505  -0.3028  -0.0529  -0.3122  -0.1028  -0.3096  -0.0762  -0.3196  -0.0847  Ln initial income per capita 
  [0.0560]***  [0.0657]  [0.0460]***  [0.0533]  [0.0473]***  [0.0483]**  [0.0468]***  [0.0530]  [0.0479]***  [0.0484]* 
0.8079  0.9852  0.8029  0.942  0.7534  0.8505  0.7521  0.9384  0.6835  0.9112  Av investment to GDP 
  [0.3064]***  [0.2806]***  [0.3110]**  [0.3097]***  [0.3126]**  [0.2842]***  [0.3243]**  [0.2862]***  [0.3025]**  [0.2946]*** 
Years schooling  0.0286  -0.0022  0.0305  0.0039  0.0301  0.0196  0.0301  0.0108  0.0252  0.011 
  [0.0140]**  [0.0193]  [0.0143]**  [0.0168]  [0.0145]**  [0.0161]  [0.0145]**  [0.0161]  [0.0148]*  [0.0143] 
4.7321  -0.9328  4.8012  -0.1238  4.7648  -0.9325  4.7266  -0.8469  4.7277  -1.9786  Pop growth 
  [3.1908]  [1.7681]  [3.1706]  [2.6259]  [3.1514]  [2.0722]  [3.2036]  [2.2271]  [3.1587]  [3.1068] 
Gross FO to GDP      -0.0008  -0.005  -0.0371  -0.0612  -0.0191  -0.0057  -0.0825  -0.0724 
      [0.0082]  [0.0074]  [0.0169]**  [0.0221]***  [0.0187]  [0.0228]  [0.0277]***  [0.0325]** 
Private credit to GDP (PC)          -0.0241  -0.0627  -0.0147  -0.0145  -0.1687  -0.2476 
        [0.0358]  [0.0394]  [0.0410]  [0.0596]  [0.0986]*  [0.1535]   
Gross FO*high PC          0.0380  0.0628         
          [0.0160]**  [0.0215]***         
Gross FO*PC              0.0174  0.0018  0.1761  0.2024 
              [0.0152]  [0.0195]  [0.0518]***  [0.0814]** 
PC squared                  0.0798  0.157 
                [0.0436]*  [0.0832]* 
FO* PC squared   
 
              -0.0845  -0.115 
                  [0.0242]***  [0.0464]** 
Constant  2.1202  0.41  2.3375  0.3923  2.4632  0.8071  2.4252  0.5727  2.6252  0.7355 
   [0.4557]***  [0.4255]  [0.3676]***  [0.3350]  [0.3815]***  [0.3137]**  [0.3802]***  [0.3393]*  [0.3915]***  [0.3319]** 
Observations  460  460  457  457  456  456  456  456  456  456 
Adj R-squared  0.2915    0.3131    0.3259    0.3149    0.338   
AR2 test p-value    0.3191    0.2498    0.2323    0.3333    0.4474 
Hansen p-value    0.264    0.3873    0.4966    0.406    0.5246 
 
 
Notes: All specifications include base controls in Table 2 and period effects, which are not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** indicate significance 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. FE: country fixed effects with robust standard errors clustered by country. GMM system (sys GMM) estimation: Two step using Windmeijer 
standard errors with small sample correction and control variables treated as endogenous (instrumented using 2nd lag). 
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Table 3. Sub-sample Sensitivities: Private Credit and Gross Financial Openness to GDP Interaction Coefficients 
 
    [1] Full sample  [2] Ex OPEC  [3] Ex OFCs  [4] Ex Asian crisis countries 
    FE  Sys GMM  FE  Sys GMM  FE  Sys GMM  FE  Sys GMM 
Gross FO  -0.0008  -0.0050  -0.0007  -0.0041  -0.0235  -0.0267  0.0000  -0.0040  A. No 
interaction    [0.0082]  [0.0074]  [0.0080]  [0.0071]  [0.0080]***  [0.0138]*  [0.0081]  [0.0074] 
Gross FO  -0.0371  -0.0612  -0.0404  -0.0482  -0.0632  -0.0586  -0.045  -0.0499  B. High/low 
interaction    [0.0169]**  [0.0221]***  [0.0169]**  [0.0196]**  [0.0163]***  [0.0231]**  [0.0177]**  [0.0200]** 
  Gross FO*high PC  0.038  0.0628  0.042  0.0513  0.0415  0.0355  0.0472  0.0521 
    [0.0160]**  [0.0215]***  [0.0164]**  [0.0188]***  [0.0138]***  [0.0231]  [0.0176]***  [0.0198]** 
Gross FO  -0.0191  -0.0057  -0.0157  -0.0026  -0.0526  -0.0479  -0.0204  -0.0027  C. Linear 
interaction    [0.0187]  [0.0228]  [0.0179]  [0.0188]  [0.0161]***  [0.0231]**  [0.0187]  [0.0222] 
  Gross FO*PC  0.0174  0.0018  0.0147  -0.0002  0.0258  0.0188  0.0194  -0.0002 
    [0.0152]  [0.0195]  [0.0144]  [0.0156]  [0.0119]**  [0.0155]  [0.0159]  [0.0198] 
  PC cutoff for positive 
overall gross FO coeff.  >1.10  >3.22  >1.07  n.a.  >2.04  >2.55  >1.05  n.a. 
Gross FO  -0.0825  -0.0724  -0.0789  -0.0653  -0.0958  -0.0658  -0.0893  -0.0746  D. Quadratic 
interaction    [0.0277]***  [0.0325]**  [0.0269]***  [0.0294]**  [0.0267]***  [0.0488]  [0.0281]***  [0.0365]** 
  Gross FO*PC  0.1761  0.2024  0.1722  0.1844  0.1507  0.0673  0.1927  0.2195 
    [0.0518]***  [0.0814]**  [0.0512]***  [0.0799]**  [0.0542]***  [0.1002]  [0.0532]***  [0.0957]** 
  Gross FO* PC squared  -0.0845  -0.115  -0.0835  -0.1048  -0.0639  -0.0246  -0.0924  -0.1251 
    [0.0242]***  [0.0464]**  [0.0241]***  [0.0457]**  [0.0244]**  [0.0494]  [0.0247]***  [0.0551]** 
  0.711  0.500  0.688  0.492  n.a.  n.a.  0.694  0.461 
 
PC cutoffs at which overall 
gross FO coeff. is zero:
a  1.372  1.260  1.375  1.268  n.a.  n.a.  1.391  1.294 
  % observations above lower 
cutoff                 
  Industrial countries  60%  80%  62%  80%  n.a.  n.a.  62%  81% 
  Emerging economies  21%  42%  25%  46%  n.a.  n.a.  20%  43% 
  Other developing countries  1%  10%  1%  8%  n.a.  n.a.  1%  12% 
 
a Cutoff is not available if the overall FO coefficient estimated as a function of the threshold variable does not have a quadratic root.  
 
Notes: All specifications include base controls in Table 2 and period effects, which are not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, **, 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. FE: country fixed effects with robust standard errors clustered by country. GMM 
system estimation: Two step using Windmeijer standard errors with small sample correction and control variables treated as endogenous (instrumented 
using 2nd lag).   44 
Table 4A. Interaction Coefficients with Private Credit to GDP and Different Financial Openness Measures 
 
Stock Measures (relative to GDP) 
 
    [1] Gross measure    [2] Total liabilities  [3] FDI + portfolio equity  [4] Debt liabilities 
    FE  Sys GMM  FE  Sys GMM  FE  Sys GMM  FE  Sys GMM 
FO  -0.0008  -0.005  -0.0174  -0.0202  0.0352  0.0051  -0.0366  -0.031  A. No 
interaction    [0.0082]  [0.0074]  [0.0168]  [0.0175]  [0.0272]  [0.0315]  [0.0177]**  [0.0237] 
FO  -0.0371  -0.0612  -0.0722  -0.1025  -0.1764  -0.2233  -0.0839  -0.1231  B. High/low 
interaction    [0.0169]**  [0.0221]***  [0.0205]***  [0.0286]***  [0.1135]  [0.1756]  [0.0213]***  [0.0332]*** 
  FO*high PC  0.038  0.0628  0.0619  0.1066  0.2205  0.2518  0.0574  0.1248 
    [0.0160]**  [0.0215]***  [0.0189]***  [0.0303]***  [0.1119]*  [0.1819]  [0.0189]***  [0.0367]*** 
FO  -0.0191  -0.0057  -0.0672  -0.0362  0.021  0.1107  -0.0792  -0.0581  C. Linear 
interaction    [0.0187]  [0.0228]  [0.0253]***  [0.0315]  [0.1032]  [0.1234]  [0.0268]***  [0.0247]** 
  FO*PC  0.0174  0.0018  0.0591  0.024  0.0114  -0.084  0.0692  0.0477 
    [0.0152]  [0.0195]  [0.0256]**  [0.0305]  [0.0777]  [0.0985]  [0.0357]*  [0.0502] 
  PC cutoff for positive 
overall FO coefficient  >1.10  >3.22  >1.14  >1.31  n.a.  <1.97  >1.14  >-0.31 
FO  -0.0825  -0.0724  -0.1495  -0.1341  -0.3502  -0.1694  -0.1454  -0.159  D. Quadratic 
interaction    [0.0277]***  [0.0325]**  [0.0330]***  [0.0402]***  [0.1622]**  [0.2421]  [0.0381]***  [0.0366]*** 
  FO*PC  0.1761  0.2024  0.3258  0.3715  0.8555  0.6364  0.3125  0.4258 
    [0.0518]***  [0.0814]**  [0.0792]***  [0.1014]***  [0.2794]***  [0.4204]  [0.1048]***  [0.1202]*** 
  FO* PC squared  -0.0845  -0.115  -0.1596  -0.2099  -0.4381  -0.3969  -0.1585  -0.249 
    [0.0242]***  [0.0464]**  [0.0413]***  [0.0602]***  [0.1288]***  [0.1994]**  [0.0548]***  [0.0715]*** 
  0.711  0.500  0.697  0.505  0.584  0.337  0.752  0.551 
 
PC cutoffs at which overall 
FO coefficient zero:  1.372  1.260  1.345  1.264  1.369  1.266  1.220  1.159 
  % observations above lower 
cutoff                 
  Industrial countries  60%  80%  62%  80%  71%  91%  56%  75% 
  Emerging economies  21%  42%  22%  42%  33%  58%  17%  37% 
  Other developing countries  1%  10%  1%  9%  5%  20%  1%  7% 
 
Notes: All specifications include the same base controls as in Table 2 and period effects, which are not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Also see notes to Table 3.   45 
Table 4B. Interaction Coefficients with Private Credit to GDP and Different Financial Openness Measures 
 
Flow Measures (relative to GDP) 
 
 
    [1] Gross flows    [2] Total inflows  [3] FDI + port. eq. inflows  [4] Debt inflows 
    FE  Sys GMM  FE  Sys GMM  FE  Sys GMM  FE  Sys GMM 
FO  0.0539  0.0277  0.1025  0.1343  0.3307  0.3683  0.0911  0.173  A. No 
interaction    [0.0368]  [0.0440]  [0.0808]  [0.0616]**  [0.0916]***  [0.1962]*  [0.0919]  [0.1203] 
FO  0.3931  0.1229  0.8829  0.9599  -0.1891  0.1585  0.9959  1.4456  B. High/low 
interaction    [0.2046]*  [0.6629]  [0.2255]***  [0.5288]*  [0.6742]  [1.6524]  [0.1858]***  [0.5775]** 
  FO*high PC  -0.3495  -0.0659  -0.8278  -0.8475  0.5464  0.2146  -0.9642  -1.3112 
    [0.2049]*  [0.6572]  [0.2305]***  [0.5197]  [0.6829]  [1.7114]  [0.1901]***  [0.5558]** 
FO  0.1447  0.189  0.3186  0.4339  0.9633  2.0915  0.456  0.6122  C. Linear 
interaction    [0.1168]  [0.2165]  [0.2057]  [0.3120]  [0.8197]  [1.2152]*  [0.2332]*  [0.3992] 
  FO*PC  -0.1038  -0.1269  -0.2997  -0.3059  -0.6054  -1.5512  -0.582  -0.6076 
    [0.0929]  [0.1724]  [0.2214]  [0.2691]  [0.7299]  [1.0439]  [0.3666]  [0.5376] 
  PC cutoff for positive 
overall FO coefficient  <1.39  <0.26  <1.06  <10.12  <1.59  <12.35  <0.78  <0.99 
FO  0.2085  -0.2087  0.9311  0.9015  -1.1963  -0.4571  1.1183  1.706  D. Quadratic 
interaction    [0.2317]  [0.4957]  [0.3238]***  [0.6844]  [1.1833]  [2.0809]  [0.2762]***  [0.7045]** 
  FO*PC  -0.2824  0.6634  -2.0279  -1.7388  6.1905  6.5172  -2.5299  -3.8141 
    [0.5078]  [0.9660]  [0.8380]**  [1.8620]  [2.5132]**  [5.4541]  [0.6619]***  [1.8492]** 
  FO* PC squared  0.108  -0.3839  1.0608  0.8488  -4.2428  -5.0065  1.2849  1.9293 
    [0.2636]  [0.4801]  [0.4637]**  [1.0722]  [1.3188]***  [3.2263]  [0.3488]***  [1.1016]* 
  n.a.  0.41  0.77  n.a.  0.23  0.07  0.67  0.68 
 
PC cutoffs at which overall 
FO coefficient zero:  n.a.  1.31  1.15  n.a.  1.23  1.23  1.30  1.29 
  % observations above lower 
cutoff                 
  Industrial countries  n.a.  87%  50%  n.a.  98%  100%  64%  63% 
  Emerging economies  n.a.  50%  16%  n.a.  78%  98%  25%  24% 
  Other developing countries  n.a.  14%  1%  n.a.  48%  88%  2%  2% 
 
Notes: Port. eq. denotes portfolio equity. All specifications include the same base controls as in Table 2 and period effects, which are not reported. Standard errors in 
parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Also see notes to Table 3.   46 




[1] Private credit to GDP 
as threshold 
[2] Institutional quality index 
as threshold 
[3] Trade openness to GDP 
as threshold 
[4] Ln initial GDP per 
capita as threshold 
    FE  Sys GMM  FE  Sys GMM  FE  Sys GMM  FE  Sys GMM 
Gross FO  -0.0371  -0.0612  -0.0657  -0.0773  -0.0155  -0.0618  -0.0383  -0.0774  A. High/low 
interaction    [0.0169]**  [0.0221]***  [0.0196]***  [0.0396]*  [0.0083]*  [0.0254]**  [0.0146]**  [0.0322]** 
  Gross FO*high threshold   0.038  0.0628  0.0721  0.0782  0.0143  0.0598  0.0419  0.0794 
    [0.0160]**  [0.0215]***  [0.0208]***  [0.0396]*  [0.0074]*  [0.0247]**  [0.0161]**  [0.0327]** 
Gross FO  -0.0191  -0.0057  -0.0282  -0.0148  -0.0156  -0.0302  -0.1171  -0.266  B. Linear 
interaction    [0.0187]  [0.0228]  [0.0154]*  [0.0197]  [0.0102]  [0.0189]  [0.0785]  [0.1185]** 
  Gross FO*threshold 
variable  0.0174  0.0018  0.0236  0.0113  0.0077  0.0154  0.0121  0.0263 
    [0.0152]  [0.0195]  [0.0099]**  [0.0106]  [0.0048]  [0.0122]  [0.0079]  [0.0117]** 
  Threshold cutoff for 
positive FO coefficient  >1.10  >3.22  >1.19  >1.31  >2.02  >1.97  >9.64  >10.12 
FO  -0.0825  -0.0724  -0.0179  -0.0121  -0.0386  -0.0795  -1.3559  -1.7303  C. Quadratic 
interaction    [0.0277]***  [0.0325]**  [0.0084]**  [0.0108]  [0.0137]***  [0.0262]***  [0.7836]*  [1.2973] 
  Gross FO*threshold 
variable  0.1761  0.2024  0.0724  0.0779  0.0342  0.0733  0.289  0.3637 
    [0.0518]***  [0.0814]**  [0.0256]***  [0.0262]***  [0.0161]**  [0.0249]***  [0.1769]  [0.3019] 
  -0.0845  -0.115  -0.0339  -0.0421  -0.0056  -0.0147  -0.0153  -0.0191 
 
Gross FO* threshold 
variable squared  [0.0242]***  [0.0464]**  [0.0152]**  [0.0155]***  [0.0042]  [0.0055]***  [0.0098]  [0.0172] 
  0.711  0.500  0.285  0.171  1.496  1.602  8.569  -6.129 
 
Threshold cutoffs at which 
overall FO coeff. zero:  1.372  1.260  1.848  1.681  4.633  3.368  10.368  3.827 
  % observations above lower 
cutoff                 
  Industrial countries  60%  80%  100%  100%  2%  2%  100%  100% 
  Emerging economies  21%  42%  29%  29%  7%  6%  49%  100% 
  Other developing countries  1%  10%  17%  21%  2%  1%  22%  100% 
 
Notes: All specifications include the same base controls as in Table 2 and period effects, which are not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** 




Table A1. Country Sample 
 


























































































Notes: The sample comprises 84 countries—21 industrial and 63 developing (of which 21 are emerging 
market economies, EMs, and 42 are other developing countries, ODCs). 
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Table A2. Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
Variable  Sources 
Growth rate of PPP per capita GDP (log 
difference over period divided by length) 
PWT 
GDP per capita PPP, 1996 constant prices  PWT 
Average investment to GDP  PWT 
Average schooling years in population over 25 
years old 
Updated Barro and Lee (2000) database. Data 
available at 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html 
Average annual population growth rate (log 
difference over period divided by length) 
WDI 
Gross de facto financial openness to  GDP  Stock data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). 
Current price US dollar GDP data from WDI. 
Stock of external liabilities to GDP  As above 
Stock of external FDI and portfolio equity 
liabilities to GDP 
As above 
Stock of external debt liabilities to GDP  As above 
Gross flows to GDP defined as sum of 
absolute inflows and absolute outflows 
Flow data from IMF IFS. Current price US dollar 
GDP data from WDI. 
Total financial inflows to GDP  As above 
FDI plus portfolio equity inflows to GDP  As above 
Debt inflows to GDP  As above 
Domestic credit to private sector to GDP  WDI 
Current price trade openness (exports plus 
imports) to GDP 
PWT 
Average institutional quality index  Simple average of six World Bank Governance 
Indicators (data available from 1996) 
Rigidity of employment index for employing 
workers 
World Bank / International Finance Corporate 
Doing Business Database (data available from 
2003) 
Annual CPI inflation  IFS 
 
Notes: PWT: Penn World Tables (version 6.2); IFS: International Financial Statistics; WDI: World 
Development Indicators. 
 